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Judicial Settlement-Seeking in
Parenting Cases: A Mock Trial
Noel Semple

*

INTRODUCTION
Judges have long employed a range of techniques to motivate the voluntary
resolution of legal disputes during pretrial conferences.' This includes child custody and visitation cases, which arise when adults are unable to agree about how
to divide the rights and responsibilities of parenthood. A small amount of literature, written primarily by the judges themselves, discusses judicial settlementseeking in the context of these family disputes.2 The author's empirical research
has identified judicial settlement-seeking strategies in custody and visitation cases,
and points of consensus and controversy among those who do this work. 3
This paper critically evaluates judicial mediation in parenting disputes by asking whether, and to what extent, it is in the best interests of the children involved.
It begins by identifying several features that distinguish child custody and visita* J.D.; Ph.D; Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Centre for the Legal Profession, University of Toronto Faculty of Law. An excerpt of this article appeared in Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, The
Multi-Tasking Judge: Comparative Judicial Dispute Resolution (2013).
1. The most recent contributions to this literature include Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected
Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 271 (2011); Tania Sourdin, Five Reasons Why Judges Should Conduct Settlement Conferences,
37 MONASH U. L. REV. 145 (2011); Peter Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate about
Judges Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 335 (2006) [hereinafter, Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation]; Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge - Legal
Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An EmpiricalDocumentation ofJudicialSettlement Conference Practices and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113 (2009) [hereinafter Robinson, Legal Lion]; Peter
Robinson, Opening Pandora'sBox: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference
Practicesand Techniques, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 53 (2012) [hereinafter Robinson, Opening
Pandora'sBox]; Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement Conferences Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges FacilitatingCommunication, Compromise and Fear, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97
(2012).
2. E.g., Joanne Goss, Judicial Dispute Resolution: Program Setup and Evaluation in Edmonton, 42
FAM. CT. REV. 511 (2004); Jacqueline W. Silbermann, Child Custody in Contested Matrimonials, 80
N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 16 (2008); Abraham H. Lieff, Pretrial of Family Law in the Supreme Court of Ontario
- Simplify and Expedite, 10 LAW SOC'Y OF UPPER CAN. GAz. 300 (1976); Hugh F. Landerkin, Custody Disputes in the Provincial Court of Alberta A New Judicial Dispute Resolution Model, 35 ALTA. L.
REv. 627 (1997); T.J. Gove, Judge-Mediated Case Conferences in Family Law: Looking for the Best
Attainable Outcome, 57 ADVOCATE 855 (1999); The Honourable Frangois Rolland, Chief Justice of the
Superior Court of Qu6bec, Mediation/Arbitration in Family Law: Pros and Cons, Presentation at the
Winkler Lecture on Civil Justice Reform (Oct. 6, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/index.php?option=comdocman&task=doc download&gid=3115)
Peter Robinson surveyed seventy-two California family law judges about settlement-seeking
techniques. Robinson, Legal Lion, supra note 2.
3. Noel Semple, Judicial Settlement-Seeking in Parenting Disputes: Consensus and Controversy,
29 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 309 (2012) [hereinafter Semple, Consensus and Controversy]. This article
was based on interviews with 29 judges and other family law professionals in Toronto and New York
City. The York University Human Participants Review Sub-Committee granted ethics approval for the
interviews (Certificate Number 2009-161, granted on November 25, 2009).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

1

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 3
302

JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2013

tion disputes from other types of civil litigation, and which are relevant to the
normative analysis ofjudicial mediation in this context.
Next, this paper describes and evaluates three arguments that might be made
against the use of judicial settlement-seeking to resolve custody and visitation
disputes. First, one might argue that there is too much settlement and not enough
neutral adjudication of civil cases in general, or of parenting cases in particular.
Second, one might applaud settlement in these cases but say the efforts of the
justice system to encourage it are ineffectual or inappropriate. Third, one might
approve of settlement-seeking by the justice system in custody and visitation cases, but maintain that the system's reliance on judges to do this work is mistaken.
The first two arguments can be rejected, but the author argues the third point
has substantial merit. This paper will conclude by arguing that facilitative mediation by non-judges has significant advantages over judicial settlement-seeking in
child custody and visitation cases. Assigning settlement-seeking to facilitative
mediators could greatly improve both settlement-seeking and adjudication in
family court.
I. THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF PARENTING DISPUTES
The most important feature distinguishing custody and visitation suits from
other civil litigation is the doctrinal supremacy of the interests of a non-party - the
child. Throughout the West, the legally correct outcome to a private parenting
dispute is that which is best for the children involved.4 However, despite their
doctrinal supremacy, children are almost never parties to the custody and visitation litigation concerning them. Although courts and practitioners have developed
a variety of methods to hear the "voice of the child," in most cases the child is not
5
an active participant.
A second distinctive feature of custody and visitation suits is the prevalence
of self-representation by adult litigants. For example, in California, 75% of court6
adjunct family mediation cases in 2008 had at least one self-represented party. In
many North American jurisdictions the majority of cases involve at least one selfrepresented party, and the proportion of litigants without lawyers in these cases is
generally thought to be increasing. 7 The high rate of self-representation is driven
8
by a combination of financial and non-financial factors.

4. D. Marianne Blair & Merle H. Weiner, Reolving Parental Custody Disputes - A Comparative
Exploration, 39 FAM. L.Q. 247 (2005). In Ontario see, e.g., Divorce Act, R.S.C.1985, c. 3 (Can.);
Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 12 (Can.). In New York State, see, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §240 (McKinney 2013).
5. Noel Semple, The Silent Child: A Quantitative Analysis of Children's Evidence in Canadian
Custody and Access Cases, 28 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 7 (2009).
6. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, Snapshot Study 2008: Summary Findings, 6 (2010),
available at
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Snapshot 2008_summaryfindingsFINALOctil update.pdf.
The overall self-representation rate in this sample was 58%. Id
7. Randall T. Shephard, The Self-Represented Litigant: Implications for the Bench and Bar, 48
FAM. CT. REv. 609 (2010).
8. Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 378-79 (2005); Herbert M.
Kritzer, Examining the Real Demandfor Legal Services, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 255 (2010).
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A third key element of custody and visitation disputes is the prospective and
relationship-focused nature of the legal inquiry.9 Unlike most civil cases, visitation disputes are primarily about the future rather than the past. The goal is to
determine what will be best for the child going forward, even if the relevant evidence is largely historical in nature.' 0 By contrast to litigants in tort claims, litigants in parenting cases will not usually become strangers once the dispute is
resolved. It is increasingly common for joint legal custody to be ordered and for
children to spend substantial amounts of time with both of their parents after they
separate."
Moreover, the nature of the parties' interaction has a powerful impact on the
children involved.12 Specifically, researchers have established that parental conflict has a negative impact on children, especially if that conflict is apparent to the
child.13 Evaluating settlement-seeking alternatives in parenting cases therefore
requires special attentiveness to the quality of the settlements.' 4 Some parents
who settle have arrived at a position of deep and abiding respect and long-term
harmony; others are simply catching their breath for the next round of litigation.' 5
To evaluate judicial settlement-seeking exclusively by the number of settlements
it produces would be no wiser than evaluating a surgeon exclusively on the basis
of how many surgeries she is able to conduct per day, without asking what happens to the patients after they are sewn up.1
II. CHARGE #1: PARENTING CASES ARE SETTLED Too FREQUENTLY
A. Prosecution
One argument against judicial pretrial settlement-seeking is that settlement of
custody and visitation disputes is already too frequent, and that decision-making
by neutral third parties is preferable. In 1984, Owen Fiss made what has become
the classic argument against settlement.' 7 Fiss argued that only public adjudication
serves the public goals of justice and insulates outcomes from the effects of ine9. Jana B. Singer, Dispute Resolution and the Postdivorce Family: Implication of a Paradigm Shift,
47 FAM. CT. REV. 363, 364 (2009).
10. Id.
11. Lawrence M. Berger et al., The Stability of Child Physical Placements Following Divorce:
Descriptive Evidence From Wisconsin, 70 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 273, 274 (2008); PAUL MILLAR, THE
BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN: AN EVIDENCE BASED APPROACH 30 (2009).

12. Liz Trinder & Joanne Kellett, Fairness and Effectiveness in Court-Based Dispute Resolution
Schemes in England, 21 INT'L J. L. POt'Y & FAM. 322,326 (2007).
13. Robin Deutsch & Marsha Kline Pruett, Child Adjustment and High-Conflict Divorce, in THE
SCIENTIFIC CHILD CUSTODY DECISIONS 353-74 (Robert M. Galatzer-Levy et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009);
Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children's Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk and Resilience
Perspectives, 52 FAM. RELATIONS 352,353 (2003).
14. Leonard Edwards, Comments on the Miller Commission Report: A California Perspective, 27
PACE L. REV. 627, 650 (2007); Rolland, supra note 3, at 16-17.
15. BERNARD S. MAYER, STAYING

WITH CONFLICT: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO ONGOING

DISPUTES 2 (1st ed. 2009). Regarding the importance of considering agreement, durability, and relitigation rates in evaluating family court dispute resolution. See Trinder & Kellett, supra note 13 at
325.
16. Marc Galanter, The Quality ofSettlements, 1988 J. Disp. Resol. 62, 83 (1988).
17. Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984).
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quality between the parties.i 8 According to Fiss, it would be better to have pure
9
justice determined by neutrals than to have compromises such as settlements.'
In elaborating on Fiss' argument, David Luban distinguished between the "instrumental" and "intrinsic good" theories of adjudication. 20 The most common
instrumental argument for adjudication is that it produces rules and precedents,
which have public value.21 Litigation may also have the benefit of publicizing
social and legal problems. 22 Beyond these instrumental claims, Luban suggests
adjudicated judgments are "reasoned elaboration and visible expression of public
values," and as such, have intrinsic value.23
In the specific context of custody and visitation disputes, there is particular
reason to be wary of settlements. The child, whose interests are doctrinally supreme, is almost never "at the table" when the settlement is reached.24 Separating
parents may therefore consent to custody or visitation arrangements that are not
best for their children. 25 David Luban observes that "two parties trying to apportion a loss are most likely to reach agreement if they can find a way to shift the
burden to a third party who is not present at the bargaining table." 26 This theory
can be applied in post-separation parenting settlement agreements. Sharing parenting duties while living apart imposes new financial and temporal costs on the
adults involved.27 These new costs might be passed on to the children.
For example, suppose parents of a two-year-old child separate and move to
towns which are 100 miles apart. They agree that the child will be in Parent A's
sole custody, but that Parent B will have visitation rights for a 6 hour period, once
every other week. This arrangement is satisfactory to both adults. It allows Parent A to have a substantial block of free time, and minimizes the number of times
that Parent B - whom she detests - visits her house. It also allows Parent B to
minimize the number of times he makes the arduous voyage between the towns.
However, there is evidence that the child's interests would be better served by
shorter, more frequent visits with Parent B.28 Given the memory span and cognitive abilities of a two-year-old, the visitation time would be more likely to foster
healthy attachment if divided into three one-hour blocks each week. By choosing
an arrangement that works well for the parents, instead of one that works well for

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 102, 108 (1986).
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion ofthe Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2621 (1995).
Trevor Farrow, Public Justice Private Resolution and Democracy, CANADIAN INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 2008; Coleman & Silver, supra note 20, at 114-15.
22. Sylvia Shaz Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging
Settlements, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 55 (2007); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in
an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or the Law of ADR, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV 1,
25-30 (1991).
23. Luban, supra note 20, at 2626.
24. Semple, Consesus and Controversy, supra note 4, at §111(2).
25. Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1015, 1032-33 (1985).
26. Luban, supra note 20, at 2626.
27. E.g. the cost of maintaining living space and amenities for children in two different homes, and
the time cost of transporting children between the homes.
28. Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make Appropriate
Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CT. REV. 297, 300
(2000).
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their child, these parents have passed the costs of the compromise on to a third
party, their child.
Separating parents may also unintentionally externalize the loss of the economic and emotional benefits of cohabitation by passing the loss on to their children. Consider the case of a "traditional" family with one breadwinner parent and
one homemaker parent. Apart from 10 hours per week with the breadwinner, the
child is cared for by the homemaker. When they divorce, the breadwinner is
threatened with the loss of affectionate companionship at the end of a workday.
The homemaker is threatened with the loss of the financial benefits of the breadwinner's income. In negotiating a parenting arrangement, the breadwinner asks to
have the child spend 25 hours per week in his company. This is far more time
than he spent with the child before divorce, and he will likely struggle to provide
this much high-quality parenting after divorce. However, his proposed arrangement assuages the loneliness brought about by the loss of his family. The homemaker accepts this arrangement, in exchange for a support award and property
division more generous than the law provides.
The settlement is satisfactory to the parents, but may not reflect the best interest of the child, which is probably better served by a schedule more similar to the
pre-divorce parenting arrangements. 29 By contrast, a judge directed to identify the
best interest of the child would in principle be unswayed by the parents' personal
interests. To the extent that adjudication can produce parenting arrangements that
are more closely aligned with the child's interests than settlement terms would be,
one might argue there is too much settlement and not enough adjudication of custody and visitation cases.
B. Defense
The Fiss and Luban arguments for adjudication have been answered by compelling generalist arguments for settlement. Research indicates that parties prefer
settlement, that settlement is more affordable for everyone involved, and that it
produces better outcomes, deterrence, and moral education. 30 Carrie MenkelMeadow argues persuasively that a settlement need not be a "compromise" of
justice - it also has the potential to create better justice, or at least more satisfaction for all parties, than an adjudicated outcome would.3 ' To the extent that there
is an adjudication-versus-settlement debate, the settlement side would appear to be
ascendant. 32 In fact, the formerly polarized debate between settlement and adjudication proponents has largely been replaced by more nuanced questions about
29. American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 cmt. b (2002).

30. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Setttements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1350 (1994); Lon L. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44
S. CAL. L. REv. 305,316 (1971); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995) [hereinafter
Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?].
31. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute is it Anyway?, supra note 30, at 2674; Carrie MenkelMeadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33
UCLA L. REV. 485,487 (1985) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement].
32. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1266 (2005).
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"when, how, and under what circumstances" cases should be settled or adjudicated.
Arguments for more adjudication of parenting cases are weakened by the real
limitations of the justice system. Given that the existing judiciary is, at best, barely
sufficient to handle the small minority of custody and visitation cases which are
adjudicated, many more judges would be required if adjudication rates increased.34 In the absence of concerns about protecting a child, the state has little
basis for denying separating parents the rights that that other parents have to make
decisions about how, and by whom, their children will be cared for.35
The fact that parents sometimes reach settlement agreements that are contrary
to their children's interests does not mean that adjudication is better able to satisfy
those interests. It is notoriously difficult for a judge to determine which parenting
arrangement would be "best" for a specific child. It is the author's observation
that the keys to making such a determination are (i) knowledge of the parents'
abilities to meet the child's needs, and (ii) knowledge of the child in question.
Even after a two-week trial, the judge's understanding of a child's needs and interests will pale in comparison to that of the parents.
Most importantly, there is strong evidence that settlement of parenting disputes is generally in the best interest of the children involved. 37 Litigation imposes burdens on parents, which are passed on to their children. It can quickly drain
parents' financial and psychological resources, diminishing their ability to care for
their child. 38 Litigation also appears to increase the level of inter-parent hostility
and the likelihood the child will be exposed to it.39 Given its substantial costs and
dubious benefits, the cost of adjudicating custody and visitation cases exceeds its
benefits for many of the children who are involved in it. 40

33. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 30, at 2664-65; Menkel-Meadow,
Forand Against Settlement, supra note 31, at 498.
34. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L.
Rev. 631, 659 (1994).
35. Mnookin, supra note 25, at 1034.
36. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 153 (2005); Noel Semple,
Whose Best Interests?, 48 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 287 (2010).
37. See also Semple, Whose Best Interests?, supra note 36, at 321-25 (developing the argument
more at length).
38. Regarding the financial impact of parenting litigation on families, see Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programsand the Unified Family Court: A PublicHealth Perspective, 32 FAM.
L. Q. 95, 105 (1998) [hereinafter Schepard, Public Health Perspective]; CORNELIA BRENTANO &
ALISON CLARK-STEWART, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 135 (2006). See also the figures in

Semple, Whose Best Interests?, supra note 36, at 322.
39. Marsha Kline Pruett and Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer's Role During the Divorce Process:
Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and Their Attorneys, 33 Fam. L. Q. 283, 288 (1999);
Marsha Kline Pruett, Glendessa M. Insabella and Katherine Gustafson, A Court-BasedIntervention for
SeparatingParents with Young Children, 43 FAM. CT. REV. 38 (2005); HARVEY BROWNSTONE, TUG
OF WAR: A JUDGE'S VERDICT ON SEPARATION, CUSTODY BATTLES, AND THE BITTER REALITIES OF
FAMILY COURT 12 (2009).

40. Semple, Whose Best Interests?,supra note 36, at 319-25.
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III. CHARGE #2: THE JUDICIARY SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE SETTLEMENT

A. Prosecution
The specificities of parenting disputes do not provide a justification to discourage settlements. If anything, they suggest that the present level of litigation
and adjudication is excessive for children's interests. However a second possible
line of attack on judicial settlement-seeking is that, while settlement is a good
thing, the justice system should not or does not need to actively encourage it. 4 1
The justice system includes not only judges but also other public employees and
contractors including mediators.
Most cases settle, whether or not the justice system does anything to encourage this outcome. 42 Settlements may be reached within "the shadow of the law,"
on the basis of the parties' predictions of what the adjudicated outcome would
be.43 A building or tree casts a shadow without having to try to do so; likewise it
might be sufficient for the justice system to passively cast a settlement-fostering
shadow. Moreover, settlements might grow outside of the shadow of the law, on
the basis of the natural potential of human beings to recognize the interests of
others and find creative solutions which "expand their pie."" Court-sponsored
mediation might diminish litigants' incentive to negotiate settlement on their own.
For example lawyers might see no need to even attempt bilateral settlement negotiations if they can simply wait and engage in those negotiations at court in the
presence of the judge.4 5
Even if it is true that more child custody and visitation cases should be settled, in some cases the best interests of the child can only be protected through an
adjudicated outcome.46 Examples include cases in which one parent has alienated
the child from the other, and cases in which the more fit parent would concede
sole custody to the less-fit parent in a settlement negotiation due to unequal bargaining power. 47 In such cases, mandatory mediation or other alternative dispute
resolution interventions can be a barrier to justice, regardless of whether they are
led by judges or by other justice system workers. Requiring litigants to participate
41. For a summary of the debate about court-sponsored ADR and adjudication, see Judith Resnik,
Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 211, 241 (1995).
42. Marc Galanter, A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States,
12 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 3 (1985); Mavis Maclean, Family Mediation: Alternative or Additional Dispute
Resolution?, 32 J. Soc. WEL.& FAM. L. 105, 106 (2010).
43. Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
44. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?, supra note 30, at 2675-76; Louise Otis & Eric
H. Reiter, Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation of Justice, 6 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 351, 357 (2006). For an empirical study of the nature and extent of law's shadow in family dispute resolution, see BECKY BATAGOL & THEA BROWN, BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE
LAW: THE CASE OF FAMILY MEDIATION (2011).

45. H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 Rutgers L. Rev. 431, 439 (1986); Michael
Stevenson, Garry D. Watson & Edward Weissman, The Impact of Pretrial Conferences: An Interim
Report on the Ontario Pretrial Conference Experiment, 15 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 591, 595 (1977).
46. Lawrie Moloney, et al., Evaluating The Work Of Australia's Family Relationship Centres:
Evidence From The First 5 Years, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 234, 245 (2013).
47. Nicholas Bala, et al., Alienated Children and Parental Separation: Legal Responses in Canada's
Family Court, 33 QUEEN'S L.J. 79 (2007).
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in mediation before they can access authoritative decision-making means requiring them to spend more time and professional fees in order to obtain a judgment. 48
The increased process costs to the parties created by mandatory mediation are
also a source of strategic advantage to the party better able to bear them, and
therefore a possible source of bad outcomes. 49 In the parenting context, this
means that mediation-related costs can be an impediment to reaching an outcome
which is in the best interests of the child. For example, suppose that Good Parent
and Bad Parent are divorcing. Both parties are represented by lawyers, but Bad
Parent is much wealthier and has more free time than Good Parent. Each of them
is seeking sole custody of their child, and each is willing to fight until their resources are exhausted in order to get it. It would be in the best interest of the child
for Good Parent to be awarded sole custody. If the matter reaches trial, the judge
will perceive this and make such an order.
In these circumstances, compulsory mediation increases the likelihood that
the child will end up in the custody of Bad Parent. This is because each party
must pay legal fees and expend his or her own time and energy for as long as the
dispute continues. The requirement to prepare for and attend mandatory mediation sessions imposes these costs on both parties, but wealthy Bad Parent is better
able to pay them. If the mediation-related costs cause Good Parent to run out of
money or energy and give up, the child will be left in Bad Parent's sole custody,
or in a sub-optimal compromise. In fact, anticipating mandatory mediation costs
might have even encouraged Bad Parent to bring a meritless application in the
first place, knowing that he or she will at least get something from the inevitable
compromise.so While this scenario does not describe the average custody or visitation dispute, it does illustrate the potential of mediation-related transaction costs
to work contrary to the best interests of the child.
There is also a cogent feminist critique of mandatory mediation for family
law cases.51 Feminist commentators have argued that the power imbalances and
domestic violence found in many intimate relationships make mediation of family
law disputes dangerous for vulnerable people. In these situations, rights that
would be vindicated by adjudication are often bargained away in mediation. 52

48. Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial Preferences
for Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 163 & n.39 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Mediating
Preferences]; Rosanna Langer, The Juridification and Technicisation of Alternative Dispute Resolution
Practices, 13 CAN. J.L. & Soc. 169, 182 (1998); Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 1,
47 (1993).
49. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 971-72.
50. Similar arguments have been made without reference to parenting disputes. See Sarokin, supra
note 45; Leroy J. Tomquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry,
25 WILLAMErE L. REV. 743, 762 (1989).

51. The most frequently cited articles include Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional
Language And Legal Change In Child Custody Decision-Making, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727 (1988) and
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV.
441 (1992).
52. Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545,
1596 (1991); Noel Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation and the Settlement Mission: A Feminist
Critique, 24 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 207 (2012) [hereinafter Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation].
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B. Defense
Notwithstanding these critiques, the characteristics of parenting disputes offer
compelling reasons to accept the necessity of some form of public settlement
promotion in this field. Below, this article will review convincing empirical evidence that non-judicial facilitative mediation is a form of family court settlementpromotion that reliably increases settlement rates and produces other benefits. 5 3
According to legal-economic theory, civil litigants settle when the perceived costs
of proceeding to adjudication outweigh the perceived benefitS. 54 However, the
unique characteristics of parenting disputes may reduce the perceived cost of going to trial and increase the perceived cost of settlement, leading the parties to the
mistaken belief that seeking an adjudicated outcome is preferable.
Good lawyers provide their clients with information about the costs of pursuing litigation to the point of adjudication. However, litigants in parenting cases
are often unrepresented and, therefore, lack access to this information.55 A parent
who does not hire a lawyer, and who has never been involved in civil litigation,
may have unrealistic expectations about the legal system, perhaps based on television programs such as Judge Judy or Divorce Court.56 On TV, litigants tell their
stories in their own words and receive a decision within minutes. These TV
shows make the experience of "telling it to the judge" and getting an authoritative
resolution appear much easier than it actually is. A neutral member of the justice
system can inform parties about the true costs of proceeding to trial.
Conversely, the perceived costs of settling may be unusually high in many
parenting cases. Discussing resolution of a child custody or visitation dispute with
an ex-spouse, without the assistance of a lawyer or a third party, may be a very
unpleasant prospect. Given the prevalence of domestic violence, ex-spouses may
perceive unsupervised face-to-face negotiations, such bipartite settlement negotiations, to be too risky.58 High-conflict parents that are not actively encouraged or
assisted in settling their custody dispute may be inclined toward adjudication,
hoping to avoid a difficult task while imagining a glorious vindication. A neutral
can supervise negotiations, making a difficult conversation somewhat easier and
helping to secure the physical safety of domestic violence victims.
Even if we believe that most parents should settle their custody cases, we
should not assume that they all want to.5 9 Julia Pearce and her colleagues inter53. See infra Part V.
54. See Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 339 (1986); John Bronsteen, Some Thoughts About the Economics
of Settlement, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1129 (2009).
55. See Part 1,supra.
56. Steven A. Kohm, The People's Law Versus Judge Judy Justice: Two Models of Law in
American Reality-Based Courtroom TV, 40 LAw & SocY REv. 693, 694 (2006).
57. Semple, Consensus and Controversy, supra note 3. These "neutral members of the judicial
system" may include mediators, arbitrators, or judges. Id.
58. Domestic violence is present in between 50% and 80% of the conjugal relationships that dissolve
before death, and in at least 50% of those which are subjected to family mediation. Jessica Pearson,
Mediating When Domestic Violence Is a Factor:Policies and Practicesin Court-BasedDivorce Mediation Programs, 14 MEDIATION Q. 319, 320 (1997); Robin H. Ballard et al., Factors Affecting the
Outcome of Divorce and Paternity Mediations, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 16, 17 (2011).
59. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. Disp.
RESOL. 81 (2002) (critiquing the assumption that litigants dread adjudication).
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viewed parents in an English family court in which settlement-seeking was pervasive. They reported that "many parents ... actually prefer to have the court decide,
seeing this as preferable to reaching some compromise which they would then
resent." 60 Encouragement to settle from a neutral party might be the "nudge"
which is necessary for spouses to overcome their anger and alienation and discuss
their child's future together.
The best interests of the child standard may offer another family law-specific
reason to value settlement-promotion. As noted above, it is possible that parents
will settle on terms which advance their own interests at the expense of the best
interests of the child.61 It may be possible for a neutral to encourage the parties to
62
focus on their child's interests.62
One can ask parents to carefully consider the
interests of their child without telling them what outcome those interests require.
Reminding parents to focus on the child may thus be entirely compatible with the
non-judicial facilitative mediation that this paper espouses below. 63
There remains the objection that mandatory mediation imposes useless costs
on those whose dispute will be adjudicated, and provides a strategic advantage to
the better-endowed party. Two points can be made in response. First, mediation
that does not produce a settlement is not necessarily a waste of time.6 It may
open the lines of communication between the parties and allow them to better
understand their options. More ambitiously, in the vision of Bush and Folger,
mediation can "transform the quality of conflict interaction, so that conflicts can
actually strengthen both the parties themselves and the society they are part of."6 5
Second, the rise of triage in family court dispute resolution processes offers
hope that we may soon be able to promote settlement for the cases which should
settle, while fast-tracking the adjudication of others. 6 Family courts across North
America are investing in tools and staff to analyze incoming cases, channeling
some to mediation and others to court. While approaches vary, cases involving
domestic violence and high conflict are usually flagged for adjudication, without
60. Julia Pearce, Gwynn Davis & Jacqueline Barron, Love in a Cold Climate - Section 8
Applications under the Children Act 1989, 1999 FAM. LAW 22 (1999). See also Rebecca BaileyHarris, Jacqueline Barron & Julia Pearce, Research: Settlement Culture and the Use of the 'No Order'
Principle under the Children Act 1989, 11 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 53 (1999): "There is considerable
evidence of the dissatisfaction of parents with the outcome of 'no order' when they consider that they
have invoked the court's jurisdiction precisely for the exercise of its authority in a matter which they
find difficult to resolve themselves."
61. See Section Il(A), supra.
62. Batagol & Brown, supra note 44, at 7 (suggesting that, at least in Australia, many family mediators see advocacy for the children involved as part of their role).
63. See infra Part V.
64. See supra Part 1.
65. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation: The Transformative
Approach to Conflict, 13 (2d ed. 2005).
66. Triage is the effort to determine at an early stage which interventions are most appropriate for
each case, based on its specific characteristics. ANDREW SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND
CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES Ch. 9 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2004).
67. Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End for
Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371 (2009); Peter Salem, Debra Kulak & Robin Deutsch,
Triaging Family Court Services: The Connecticut Judicial Branch's Family Civil Intake Screen, 27
PACE L. REV. 741 (2007); Noel Semple & Carol Rogerson, Access to Family Justice: Insights and
Options, 413-449 in Middle Income Access to Justice (Michael Trebilcock, Anthony Duggan & Lome
Sossin, eds., 2012).
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wasting time in mediation.6 8 Triage allows those parties for whom settlement is
possible to avoid litigation, without forcing parties for whom adjudication may be
necessary to go through a futile mediation process before gaining access to the
courts.
The distinct nature of parenting cases provides a strong argument that the majority that ought to settle need some encouragement from a public sector neutral in
order to do so. Settlement-promotion must therefore remain a central part of the
justice system's approach to parenting disputes. However, as the subsequent section will argue, this does not necessarily mean that it is judges who should be
doing this work.
IV. CHARGE #3: JUDGES ARE NOT IDEAL SETTLEMENT-SEEKERS IN
CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES
Having been exonerated on the first two charges, judicial settlement-seeking
in parenting cases faces a third indictment. It is alleged that judges, as a group,
are not the best people to entrust with the work of settlement-seeking in custody
and visitation cases. This section will first review empirical evidence about judicial pre-trial conferences, which does not clearly establish that they increase settlement rates in family or other civil courts. This section will then identify and
consider four inherent characteristics of judges that make them unsuitable settlement-seekers in custody and visitation cases. These are: (i) high salary, (ii) ambivalence regarding the settlement-seeking role, (iii) autonomy, and (iv) authority.
A. EmpiricalEvidence on the Effect ofJudicially DirectedSettlements
It is clear that settlements are frequently reached within or shortly after judicial pretrial conferences in family courts. A survey of California judges found that
52% of the judges reported that 75% or more of their cases settle in pretrial conferences. 69 A similar Canadian survey found that only 9.3% of family law cases
that underwent judicial settlement interventions subsequently went to trial.70
However, these findings do not prove that judicial settlement-seeking brings
about settlements which would not otherwise occur. Leroy Tornquist compares
pretrial settlement conferences to folk remedies for the common cold. Those who
partake of the remedies find that their colds go away, and may consider this evidence of the remedy's efficacy.71 However, the common cold also generally dissipates in the absence of any remedy. Likewise, most cases settle no matter what
the justice system does, so the efficacy of judicial settlement-seeking requires
68. Rae Kaspiew et al., EVALUATION OF THE 2006 FAMILY LAW REFORMS E4 (2009), availableat
http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fle/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014); Glenn A. Gilmour, High-Conflict
Separationand Divorce: Optionsfor Consideration36 (2004), availableat
http://www.justice.gc.caleng/rp-pr/fl-lf/divorce/2004_1/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
69. Robinson, Legal Lion, supranote 1, at 118.
70. Goss, supra note 2, at 515; Gove, supra note 2, at 858. In many family courts, the number of
cases resolved in pretrial conferences substantially exceeds the number resolved in trials. See e.g.,
Lieff, supra note 2, at 304. In this article about the introduction of pretrials in Toronto, Justice Lieff
notes that, within a 9-month period beginning in 1975, "the court disposed of 107 cases after trial," and
"301 cases were settled as a result of and following pretrial." Id; see also Rolland, supranote 2, at I 1.
71. Tornquist, supra note 50, at 772.
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some demonstration beyond the fact that settlements emerge from judicial pretrial
conferences. 72
A few articles have suggested anecdotally that mandatory judicial pretrial
conferences increase settlement rates. 73 The strongest evidence is found in a 1977
study, which found that judicial pretrial settlement negotiations increased settlement rates.74 The study examined the pretrial settlement program introduced by
the Toronto Supreme Court of Justice in the late 1970s.75 With the cooperation of
the court, the authors were able to conduct a controlled and randomized experiment. They found that 86.4% of cases in which the parties were required to participate in settlement-oriented pretrial conferences settled, compared to a settlement rate of 68.8% in the control group.76
However, the preponderance of the evidence points in the other direction.
Three major American studies of civil court systems have failed to find support
for the proposition that judicial pre-trial settlement negotiations increase settlement rates. Maurice Rosenberg carried out perhaps the first quantitative study in
this field, examining New Jersey personal injury cases resolved in the 1960s. Rosenberg found that pretrials neither increased the likelihood of a settlement, nor
reduced the length of the trials, which occurred in the absence of settlement, nor
reduced the average period between opening and closing of the case. 77
Judicial settlement-seeking was among the topics of the 1978 "Justice Delayed" investigation into the pace of litigation and solutions to delay in urban
American courts. The report compared cities with contrasting modes of judicial
conduct, seeking correlations to settlement rates among other output criteria.
While acknowledging that the data was insufficient to establish a causative link,
the authors concluded that "the most settlement-intensive courts are the slowest
courts," and "fast courts on civil case processing need not be 'settling' courts." 79
Steven Flanders and his colleagues applied a similar methodology in ten
American federal district courts, and reached a similar conclusion. The researchers
ranked six of the courts in terms of "settlement involvement". 8 The surprising
72. Katz, supranote 48, at 47; Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supra note 45, at 595.
73. Anecdotal claims of judicial dispute resolution increasing settlement rates are found in Gwynn
Davis, Mediation in Divorce: A Theoretical Perspective, 5 J.SOC.WEL.& FAM.L. 131, 135 (1983);
Lieff, supra note 2, at 304; Harold Baer, History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their
Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 143-44 (2001); Goss, supra note 2, at 516-17. Richard S. Fox described the introduction of mandatory judicial pretrial conferences in Salt Lake City.
PretrialConferences in the District Courtfor Salt Lake County, 6 UTAH L. REV. 266 (1958). One year
later, 53.6% of the cases were settling without trial and the waiting period for those which were tried
had been reduced dramatically. Id. However, no data were provided in this report regarding settlement rates before the introduction of judicial pretrial conferences.
74. Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supra note 45 at 600-01. For a possible explanation for pilot
study successes which larger scale research fails to replicate, see infra Section IV(B)(2).
75. Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supranote 45, at 600-01.
76. Id.
77. Maurice Rosenberg, The Pretrial Conference and Effective Justice; A Controlled Test in
Personal Injury Litigation 56-58 (1964).
78. Thomas Church et al., Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Urban Trial Courts (1978),
availableat: http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/ctadmin&CISOPTR=0.
79. Id. at 33.
80. Steven Flanders, Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversies and Some Results, 4
JUST. SYs. J. 147, 161 (1978).
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result was that the court which was most involved in settlement-seeking had the
fewest case "terminations per judge" and the highest percentage of civil cases
tried. While the "Justice Delayed" and Flanders studies do not rigorously define
"settlement involvement" and do not statistically assess the relationship between
the variables, when considered in conjunction with Rosenberg's experiment they
certainly shed doubt on the efficacy of judicial settlement-seeking in bringing
about settlements. 82
A 2009 speech by Chief Justice Francois Rolland of the Superior Court of
Quebec offers evidence which is specifically about family court. Chief Justice
Rolland expressed enthusiastic support for Quebec's judicial settlement conference program for family cases. However, he acknowledged that the introduction
of settlement conferences in 2001 had not had any effect on the proportion of
cases which ended in a trial.8 3 Overall, the limited empirical data available does
not suggest that judicial pretrial conferences increase overall settlement rates.
B. Attributes ofJudicialSettlement-Seekers
Empirical research and legal commentary confirm that judicial approaches to
settlement-seeking in custody and visitation disputes are varied. 84 However, judges share four characteristics that are relevant to their suitability as settlementseekers in parenting cases. These are (i) high salary,8 5 (ii) ambivalence regarding
the settlement-seeking role,86 (iii) autonomy,87 and (iv) authority. 8 8 This section
will explain why these four characteristics make judges inappropriate for this role.
1. High Salary
Because judicial labour is more expensive than non-judicial mediators' labour, and because public resources are limited, using judges to seek settlement
means having less time available for settlement-seeking in each case. Judges are
paid substantially more than most other public-sector professionals who might do
settlement-seeking work, such as lawyers or mediators. The judges who hear
parenting disputes in Ontario, for example, are paid in excess of $250,000 per
year. 89 While a thorough compensation review is beyond the scope of this paper,

81. Id. at 161.
82. Several of the law review articles on the topic have also reached this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 93 (2003);
Menkel-Meadow, Forand Against Settlement, supra note 31, at 494; Marc Galanter, The Emergence
of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases 69 JUDICATURE 256, 265 (1986).
83. Rolland, supranote 2 at 15.
84. Semple, Consensus and Controversy, supra note 3; Thomas D. Lambros, The Judge's Role in
Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 Vill. L. Rev. 1363, 1370 (1984); Menkel-Meadow, For and
Against Settlement, supra note 31, at 506.
85. See infra Section B(1).
86. See infra Section B(2).
87. See infra Section B(3).
88. See infra Section B(4).
89. GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, PUBLIC SECTOR SALARY DISCLOSURE FOR 2012: JUDICIARY,
(last
http://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/publications/salarydisclosure/pssd/orgs.php?organization=judiciary
visited Jan. 31, 2014). See also NOEL SEMPLE, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Family Service Delivery:
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it is clear that most mediators earn much less than judges. According to a recent
job advertisement from an Ontario government agency, a family mediator with a
Masters of Social Work would be paid between $53,000 and $80,000 per year. 90
Judicial labour is also more likely than alternative labour (e.g. social worker labour) to require the payment of support staff such as clerks. The use of additional
staff increases the cost disparity between judicial and non-judicial family court
settlement mediators.
The public resources available for family court settlement-seeking are finite,
and are often said to be inadequate. 9' In under-resourced jurisdictions, having
judges do this work means having only small amounts of time available for settlement-seeking in each case.92 For example, the average judge in New York
City's Family Court (which hears custody and visitation matters arising in the
absence of a divorce) disposed of 1,927 cases in 2008.93 This equates to approximately 48 minutes of judicial time available per family, per judge, per year. 94 A
family court's settlement-seeking budget will allow more time per case if less
expensive non-judicial mediators are used. In California's court-adjunct family
mediation program, the median mediation included a ninety-minute meeting with
the parties, and fifteen minutes of preparation time.95
Having sufficient time is important for producing high-quality, durable settlements of custody and visitation disputes. Robinson's survey of California judges found that those who reported the highest settlement rates also reported having
the longest pretrial settlement conferences.9 6 Airing grievances before a neutral
mediator is one of the elements of mediation with which participants are most
satisfied.9 7 Even when non-judicial mediators lead settlement negotiations, mediations that are rushed due to resource constraints tend to be less successful.
Disease, Prevention, and Treatment, June 23, 2010 at 65, available at http://www.lco-cdo.org/familylaw-process-call-for-papers-semple.pdf.
90. See LEGAL AID ONTARIO, Careers at LAO, http://legalaid.on.ca/en/careers/default.asp (last
visited Jan. 22, 2014).
91. Andrew Schepard & Theo Liebmann, Ending 3.5-Minute Justice in New York's Family Court, N.
Y. LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 13, 2009; Susan Pigg, Breaking Up: Family Courts in Crisis,TORONTO STAR,
Oct. 3-7, 2009; Linda Diebel, Family Court Crisis; Shortage of Judges is Running up Costs, Putting
Lives on Hold, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 2007, at Al. Regarding the shortage of mediator hours, see
Salem, The Emergence of Triage, supra note 67, at 377-79.
92. Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 238 (2002); Wissler, supra
note I at 288-89.
93. Senate Policy Group, Kids and Families Still Can't Wait: The Urgent Casefor New Family
Peter
Court Judgeships, 7, http://www.nysenate.gov/files/pdfs/Family%/20Court%20Report.pdf.
Robinson reported an average of 1317 new cases per year for California family law judges. Robinson,
Legal Lion, supranote 1, at 117.
94. Testimony cited in the Senate Policy Group report suggests that each judge has 92,400 minutes
of work time per year available. Senate Policy Group, supra note 93, at 8. Dividing this number by
1,927 equals 47.95. Regarding shortages of judicial time in California, see Edwards, supra note 14 at
643-44.
95. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supra note 6, at 15.
96. Robinson, Legal Lion, supra note 1, at 120.
97. Robert A. Baruch Bush, What Do We Need a MediatorFor?, 12 OHIO ST. J.ON DiSP. RESOL. 1,
19(1996).
98. Sandra J. Perry, Tanya M. Marcum & Charles R. Stoner, Stumbling Down the Courthouse Steps:
Mediators' Perceptionsof the Stumbling Blocks to Successful Mandated Mediation in Child Custody
and Visitation, 11 PEPP. DIsp. RESOL. L. J. 441, 455-56 (2011); Connie J. Beck & Bruce Dennis Sales,
Family Mediation: Facts, Myths, and Future Prospects 27-28, 80 (1st ed., 2001); Nancy A. Welsh,
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There is evidence that mediation succeeds in large part because it allows parties to
tell their stories to a neutral who takes the time to listen. 99 If resource constraints
do not allow judges enough time to properly hear these stories, then replacing
judges with less expensive neutrals will increase the benefits of the process for
children and families.100
2. Ambivalence
Settlement of parenting cases is a worthy goal for the justice system, and it is
important to entrust this task to a cadre of employees which will pursue it diligently and consistently. In speaking to a group of enthusiastic family court judges
about their settlement-seeking activities, the author was struck by their conscientiousness and dedication. The same impression is conveyed by the few published
judicial accounts of this work.' 0' Some judges are even willing to engage in intense "emotional labour" in order to create a deep and long-lasting resolution to a
family dispute.102
However, in North America, the attitude of the family law bench as a whole
appears to be more ambivalent regarding settlement-seeking. Some judges are not
willing to seek settlement, some believe that doing so is inappropriate, and some
may only be willing to do so in a cursory fashion. 0 3 While some jurisdictions
have permanent family-specialist judges, judicial generalism prevails in much of
North America.m This means that judges hearing parenting cases often have little
interest in family law, and no pre-appointment experience with family law.
Additionally, many judges do not welcome their assignment to family court.
As Andrew Schepard noted, "assignment to the child custody court tends to be at
the bottom of the judicial prestige hierarchy . . . . Newly appointed judges are
often sent to the child custody court and cannot wait to be replaced." 05 A California judge acknowledged, forthrightly, that "juvenile and family court are the least

Reconciling Self-Determination, Coercion, and Settlement in Court-Connected Mediation, in Divorce
and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and Applications 420-446, 425 (Jay Folberg, Ann Milne
& Peter Salem eds., 2004) [hereinafter Welsh, Reconciling]; Salem, The Emergence of Triage, supra
note 67, at 377; Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation Research: Is There Empirical Support for the Field?,
22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 23 (2004) [hereinafter Kelly, Family Mediation Research].
99. Katz, supra note 48, at 48-49. Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?, supra note 97 at 19.
100. Time scarcity can also impinge upon the settlement-seeker's ability to properly prepare for the
session with the parties. See, e.g., Susan Raines & Rosemary O'Leary, Switching Hats: Issues and
Obstacles Facing Administrative Law Judges Who Mediate EPA Enforcement Disputes, 2 GOV'T
POL'Y & L. J. 58, 61 (2000).
101. Gove, supra note 2.
102. Paul Vlaardingerbroek & Machteld W. de Hoon, Emotions in Court and the Role of the Judge:
Results from Experimental Hearings in Divorce Proceedings, 2010 INT'L FAM. L. 319 (2010); Semple,
Consensus and Controversy, supra note 3, at 320-21.
103. Judges are more likely to object to settlement-seeking by the judge responsible for adjudicating
the case. Robinson, Adding Judicial Mediation, supra note 1, at 344. However, other judges do not
seek settlement even in cases which are not assigned to them. Shweder, supra note 22, at 60 et seq.;
Noel Semple, Judicial Settlement-Seeking in Parenting Disputes, supra note 3, at 315.
104. See Donna Martinson, One Case - One Specialized Judge: Why Courts Have an Obligation to
Manage Alienation and Other High-Conflict Cases, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 180, 180 (2010).
105. Schepard, supra note 66, at 117.
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favoured assignments for judges." 06 Reluctant members of the family law bench
may be more likely to limit themselves to the adjudicative role, as settlementseeking requires more active, extra-legal involvement in the case, and often more
time. o7
Ambivalence may help explain why judicial pretrial conference pilot programs using self-selected judges have produced impressive results in settlementseeking. These result have not been entirely replicated when the programs have
been scaled-up to service an entire jurisdiction. The reason may be that pilot programs involve the best and most dedicated settlement-seekers among the local
judges. For example the Stevenson et al. 1977 study discussed supra, which produced strong evidence that judicial pretrial conferences impacted settlement rates,
focused on a newly introduced pretrial conference program in Toronto's Superior
Court of Justice. 0 While cases were assigned randomly to the pretrial, test
group, or to the non-pretrial, control group, it does not appear that the participating judges were chosen at random from all of the judges on the Toronto bench. It
seems likely that the judges who volunteered to conduct the pretrial conferences
were more enthusiastic and effective settlement-seekers than the average judge in
the jurisdiction.' 09 Variations in judicial aptitude and interest for this work help
explain both (i) the success of small-scale pilot programs with self-selected judges, and (ii) the absence of a clear impact when the programs are scaled-up and
formalized over a large jurisdiction.
3. Autonomy
Procedural rules and codes of ethics give family court judges the right to
choose whether or not to seek settlement in each case.'1 0 In light of their ambivalence towards mediating settlements, this autonomy makes them collectively unreliable as settlement-seekers. Judicial autonomy is therefore a potential source of
inefficiency in the family justice system's settlement-seeking efforts, and a source
of confusion for litigants and their children.
While pretrial conferences are often mandatory in family courts, pursuing settlement in the conference is usually not mandatory. Ontario's Family Law Rules,
for example, list 19 distinct tasks that judges may perform during pretrial confer2
ences. "Exploring the chances of settling the case" is only one of these.11 Several jurisdictions, including New York State, allow judges to do whatever they
"deem appropriate" in pretrial conferences, which may or may not include pursu106. Edwards, supra note 14, at 655. See also Alastair Nicholson & Margaret Harrison, Family Law
and the Family Court of Australia: Experiences of the First 25 Years, 24 MELB. U. L. REv. 756, 76061(2000).
107. See Sharyn Roach Anleu & Kathy Mack, Magistrates' Everyday Work and Emotional Labour,
32 J.L. & Soc'y 590 (2005).
108. Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supranote 45, at 595.
109. The study found some evidence that judges "vary in their ability to stimulate settlement through
pretrial conferences." Stevenson, Watson & Weissman, supra note 45, at 612. For further discussion
of whether or not special judicial personalities are required to reap pretrial successes, see Fox, supra
note 73.
110. See infra notes 137-142.
111. Family Law Rules, 0. Reg. 114/99 (Can.).
112. Family Law Rules, 0. Reg. 114/99, at R. 17 (Can.).
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ing settlement.11 3 Similarly, codes of judicial conduct and ethics give judges the
authority, but not the duty, to pursue settlement.1 14 The American Bar Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct states that a judge "may encourage parties
to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters."' 15
This permissive language has been defended on the basis that it allows judges
to seek settlement when doing so is in the best interest of the child or the parties,
without compelling them to do so when it is not. 116 In family law, there is an
especially good reason why settlement should not be "pushed" on some litigants.
Many intimate relationships are characterized by domestic violence and power
imbalance, and these cases arguably require authoritative adjudication, lest the
weaker party be steamrolled into an unjust settlement.' 17 However, court systems
seeking to avoid unjust settlements in cases of violence and power imbalance
generally now use formal screening and triage tools to exclude these cases from
mediation." 8 By contrast, the author found no evidence of these tools being used
by settlement-seeking family court judges to pick the cases in which settlement is
pursued."19
A more straightforward explanation for the optional nature of judicial settlement-seeking is that some judges have no interest in mediating settlements, and
this permissive language allows them to avoid this task. Judges, after all, have a
central if not dominant role in drafting the procedural and ethical rules which
apply to their own work.120 It is not surprising that those rules allow discretion
with regard to a role that is not universally accepted by judges.121
Whether or not settlement-seeking will occur in a family court pretrial conference often depends on which judge happens to hear the case. This leads to substantial potential for confusion among self-represented litigants in parenting disputes.12 2 If pretrial settlement-seeking were clearly identified as mediation, and if
settlement-seeking were to consistently occur in these meetings, then parents
13. An interesting exception is found in the province of Quebec. The Code of Civil Procedure of
that province states that "in family matters ... it is the judge's duty to attempt to reconcile the parties."
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, s. 4.3 (Can.). The Code also identifies settlement-seeking
more clearly as an obligatory element of pretrial conferences: "The purpose of a settlement conference
is to facilitate dialogue between the parties and help them to identify their interests, assess their positions, negotiate and explore mutually satisfactory solutions." Id. at s. 151.16.
114. Family Law Rules, supra note 112, at R. 17; John C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics and Judicial
Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to Meet, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 569, 570
(2006); Shweder, supra note 22.
115. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.6(B) (2007), available
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/judicialethics/ABAMCJCapproved.
authcheckdam.pdf.
116. Michael R. Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the Parties to Decide through
Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETTE L. J. 429, 440 (1991); Martinson, supra note 105, at 184.
117. Noel Semple, MandatoryFamily Mediation, supra note 52, at 211-18.
118. Salem, The Emergence of Triage, supra note 67.
119. Semple, Mandatory Family Mediation, supranote 52, at 234-39.
120. Resnik, Mediating Preferences,supra note 48, at 166.
121. Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. Legal
Stud. 627, 631 (1994).
122. Gwynn Davis & Julia Pearce, A View from the Trenches - Practice and Procedure in Section 8
Applications, 29 FAM. LAW. 457 (1999). This is an example of role-blending in family law, which has
in other contexts been identified as a source of confusion for litigants. See e.g., Allan E. Barsky,
Mediative Evaluations: The Pros and Perils of Blending Roles, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 560, 564 (2007)
(regarding child custody evaluators who also seek to mediate).
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might enter the sessions in a more conciliatory frame of mind. Judges' autonomy,
and their collective ambivalence towards settlement-seeking in parenting cases,
make such reliability impossible when judges are responsible for settlementpromotion. Non-judicial mediators can at least be given a clear and explicit mandate to pursue settlement.
4. Authority
The final attribute that distinguishes judges qua settlement-seekers is their authority.123 A settlement-seeking judge typically has three types of authority. The
first is the actual ability to make an order backed by the enforcement power of the
state. In the "one-judge" or "traditional" model, used in New York State and
elsewhere, the judge that mediates pretrial settlement discussions will also have
the authority to decide the matter should the case go to trial.124 Under the twojudge or "modem" model, this is not the case.125 Under the modem model, a
different judge is assigned adjudicate the case at trial, however, the judge that
mediates the pretrial conference may still make various interim and procedural
orders, which can substantially affect the parties' rights.1 26
The second type of judicial authority is derived from the parties' perception
that judges can predict the legal outcome of a case.127 Litigants, especially when
unrepresented, tend to view judges as experts who can predict legal outcomes.
Those litigants who strategically assess settlement-seeker comments as predictions
of adjudicated outcome are, therefore, influenced by this type of informal authority. Ilan Gewurz describes the impact of legal expertise in a mediator:
The more the parties perceive the mediator's feedback to reflect a possible legal outcome - meaning, the more closely the mediator is linked to
that legal structure - the more deferential the parties are likely to be to her
intervention..., deference is more likely to occur the closer one moves into the shadow of the law.' 28
The third type ofjudicial authority is moral persuasion. 129 If a judge indicates
that a certain parenting plan is best, the parties may internalize and accept the
proposition without subjecting it to much scrutiny. People tend to defer to authority figures such as judges. One New York family court judge suggested that the
emotional state of separating parents contributes to this deference:

123. Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? - Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 101, 121 (2002).
124. Brunet, supra note 92, at 232.
125. For empirical data about the prevalence and consequences of the two models, see Wissler, supra
note I at 302-313; Robinson, Opening Pandora'sBox, supra note I at 86-87.
126. Family Law Rules, supranote 111,at R. 17.
127. Brunet, supra note 92, at 239.
128. Ilan G. Gewurz, (Re)Designing Mediation to Address the Nuances of Power Imbalance, 19
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 135, 145 (2001).
129. Rolland, supra note 2, at 14.
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The fact that I wear the robe and I am a judge means they do listen....
We have a lot of power that we have to use very carefully . .. sometimes
people feel that they have to do what we say . . . people are very vulnera-

ble when they're getting divorced and want somebody to tell them what
to do, tell them how to think about what they're doing. So they're sort of
open to being given some direction about how they ought to behave.130
Caucusing, or meeting in private with each of the sides, is an optional technique whereby a settlement-seeking pre-trial judge can enjoy increased influence
over the parties. Caucusing lets the settlement-seeker solicit information from
each party, which can either be kept confidential or selectively revealed to the
other party.131 Caucusing also gives the settlement-seeker the power to "throw
cold water" on a party's argument, talking down the merits of each side's case.1 32
The power that the settlement-seeker derives from caucusing might explain why
many settlement-seeking judges find the instrumental to reaching a settlement, 3 3
and why many scholars find it troubling.134
When a judge is the settlement-seeking party in a parenting case his judicial
authority may have an coercive effect on the parties. The settlement-seeker might
coerce a settlement, by threatening to "punish" the litigant that is more resistant to
the judge's settlement proposal.'13 The punishment might take the form of an
order that is less favourable to the noncompliant party than it otherwise might
have been.' 36 In a parenting dispute, this might mean less parenting time or diminished custodial rights for one parent.
"Friendly parent" rules exist in many jurisdictions and may facilitate judicial
coercion. Friendly parent rules create a presumption that a parent's willingness to
facilitate the child's contact with the other parent is relevant to the evaluation of
his or her parenting skills. 137 Because spending time with both parents is considered to be in the best interests of the child, the parent who is willing to facilitate
the child's contact with the other parent is deemed to be acting in the best interest
130. Interview of Justice "MM", of the New York State Supreme Court, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Sept. 28,
2010).
131. Baer, supra note 73, at 141.
132. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Evaluative Mediation: In Search of Practice Competencies, 27
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 193, 202 (2009) [hereinaftet Della Noce, Evaluative Mediation].
133. Wayne D. Brazil, HostingSettlement Conferences: Effectiveness in the Judicial Role, 3 Ohio St.
J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 1, 16 (1987); Hogan, supra note 116, at 18; Baer, supra note 73.
134. Tomquist, supra note 50, at 759; Della Noce, supra note 132; Schuck, supranote 54, at 353.
135. For allegations that judges coerce settlements, see Frank E.A. Sander, A FriendlyAmendment, 6
DisP. RESOL. MAG. 11, 22 (1999); James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not
Mediate Cases Assigned to Them for Trial,6 Disp. Resol. Mag. 11, 14 (1999).
136. Melissa Breger, Making Waves or Keeping the Calm: Analyzing the Institutional Culture of
Family Courts through the Lens of Social Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
55, 87-88 (2010).
137. Regarding the friendly parent rule generally, see Margaret K. Dore, The "Friendly Parent"
Concept: A Flawed Factorfor Child Custody, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. LAW 41 (2004); Brenda Cossman &
Roxanne Mykitiuk, Reforming Child Custody and Access Law in Canada: A Discussion Paper, 15
CAN. J. FAM. L. 13, 51 (1998). For example, Canada's Divorce Act states that "the court shall give
effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contact with each spouse as is
consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the
willingness of the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact." Divorce Act
(Canada), supra note 4 at 16(10).
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of the child.' 3 8 Therefore, the parent who is perceived as less willing to facilitate
contact is less likely to be awarded custody and/or parenting time.1 39 While the
friendly parent rule is derived from the belief that children benefit from having
on-going relationships with two loving parents,140 this is not always the reason for
its application. Especially in a one-judge system, the rule also provides a rationale
for judicial punishment of a party who refuses to accept a parenting compromise
suggested in a pre-trial conference. Parties may be reluctant to raise objections,
for fear that those objections will be considered evidence of refusal to facilitate
contact with the other parent.
However, judges need not result to coercion in order to influence the settlement process.141 Judges' presumed predictive powers and capacity for moral persuasion are influential, whether or not a judge seeks to rely upon them. In the
words of English scholar Simon Roberts:
Courts are places where people tell us what to do . . . judges are such
people. . . . Authority is inevitably going to make disputants more dis-

posed than they might otherwise be to follow their suggestions, and be
receptive to their persuasion . . . [The] judge is not in a position to discard this authority.142
In theory, a judge might adopt a purely facilitative posture which could render
her inherent authority irrelevant.14 3 However the existing research suggests that
most judges will send some sort of evaluative message during the settlementseeking process, even if that message is simply "you should settle." '" These messages are mere "trial balloons," subject to the parties' critical analysis and taken
for what they are worth. They will be accorded deference and have persuasive
force as a result of the judge's inherent authority, whether or not the judge seeks
or wishes to use it. 145
Amitai Etzioni's typology of compliance helps explain why judges have such
significant authority in this context.146 Coercive-alienative compliance occurs
when someone believes that he or she must do something or else face a sanction. 147 The judge's enforcement power creates the potential for coercivealienative compliance. Etzioni's utilitarian-calculativecompliance means that
138. Dore, The "Friendly Parent" Concept, supra note 137.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Sarokin, supra note 45, at 436.
142. Simon Roberts, Mediation in Family Disputes, 46 MOD. L. REV. 537, 556 (1983). In the United
Kingdom, a registrar (also known as a "district judge") is a judicial officer with limited authority over
family and other matters. Id.
143. Id at 550.
144. Lambros, supra note 84, at 1371; Sharon Press, Commmentary on "The Name of the Game Is
Movement: Concession Seeking in Judicial Mediation of Large Money Damage Cases", 15
MEDIATION Q. 368, 369 (1998); Brunet, supra note 92, at 234.
145. Gewurz, supranote 128, at 145.
146. Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (1975); Bernard S. Mayer,
Mediation in Child Protection Cases: The Impact of Third-Party Intervention on ParentalCompliance
Attitudes, 24 MEDIATION Q. 89, 95 (1989) (citing Amitai Etzioni, Compliance Structure, in A Sociological Reader on Complex Organizations (Amitai Etzioni & Edward W. Lehman eds., 1980)).
147. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis, supranote 146.
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someone complies in the belief that doing so will maximize rewards while minimizing costs.148 Because disputants are likely to believe that a judge will reach
the same conclusion in settlement discussions as at trial, each party will perceive
immediate settlement as offering the same rewards as going to trial, but at lower
costs. Thus, a judge's predictive power can create utilitarian-calculative compliance.
Finally, normative-moral compliance occurs when someone has a moral
commitment to the goals of the authority, and is persuaded that the proposed
course is best.149 The moral suasion power of judges may easily convince the
disputing parents that a proposed settlement is best for the child. Judicial authority in a settlement-seeker is powerful because it has the potential to produce all
three types of compliance.' 50 As such, judges rarely have to consciously engage
in coercion for these combined compliance mechanisms to take effect.
V. FACILITATIVE MEDIATION IN CUSTODY DISPUTES
A. FacilitativeMediation Generally
The problem with authoritative settlement-seeking by judges is that it diminishes the potential for party empowerment and self-determination in arriving at
settlement terms. This is the core promise of the facilitative vision of mediation.
Part V will define facilitative mediation, demonstrate its incompatibility with
authoritative judicial settlement-seeking, and review its empirical evidence base.
It concludes that the best way to safeguard the benefits of both party selfdetermination and the rule of law in parenting cases is to replace judicial pre-trial
settlement-seeking with presumptively mandatory, facilitative, non-judicial mediation, backstopped by speedy access to authoritative judicial decision-making
for the cases which require it.
The premise of facilitative mediation is that the best resolutions to human
conflicts are those generated by the conflicted parties themselves. Disputants are
therefore given the opportunity to create their own solutions and encouraged to do
so.'' Facilitated resolutions reflect disputants' own moral and pragmatic judgments, and not necessarily those of legal authorities.152 This principle, known as
"self-determination" or "party empowerment," is at the core of facilitative mediation doctrine. 53

148. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 146.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Jay Folberg, Ann Milne & Peter Salem, The Evolution of Divorce and Family Mediation: An
Overview, in Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and Applications 1, 14 (Jay
Folberg, Ann Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations,Strategies, and Techniques: A Gridfor the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 24
(1996); Bernard S. Mayer, Facilitative Mediation, in Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and Applications 29, 39 (Jay Folberg, Ann Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004).
152. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid,3 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 89 (1998).

153. Welsh, Reconciling, supranote 98, at 422.
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The predominant technique of facilitative mediation is a joint session in
which all parties are present.' 54 The facilitative mediator's role is to encourage the
parties' creation of solutions, and not to tell the parties what those solutions ought
to be. This role generally includes structuring the mediation process and asking
questions in order to improve communication between the parties.' 5 5 It does not
include predicting adjudicated outcomes or evaluating the legal merits of the parties' claims. 1 According to Zena Zumeta, a facilitative mediator is "in charge of
the process, while the parties are in charge of the outcome." 5 7 Another manifestation of the party empowerment principle in family court mediation is the fact
that the parties often have some ability to choose among available mediators.i 5 8
This opportunity, which does not exist in judicial pretrial settlement-seeking, allows parties to choose a professional mediator with specific competencies. 5 9
Facilitative mediators use a variety of methods.' 6 0 The process may or may
not involve isolating points of agreement and disagreement, identifying options,
and uncovering the interests that underlie the parties' stated positions.' 6 ' Facilitative mediation may be "therapeutic" or "relational" in nature, seeking to give the
parties a better understanding of their past, present, and future relationship.' 62 In
his influential 1971 article, Lon Fuller celebrated facilitative mediation's
capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules
on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of
their relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another... helping them to free themselves from the
encumbrance of rules and ... accepting, instead, a relationship of mutual

154. Zena Zumeta, Styles of Mediation: Facilitative, Evaluative, and Transformative Mediation,
NAT'L Ass'N FOR CMTY. MEDIATION NEWSLETTER (2000), available at
http://www.mediate.com/articles/zumeta.cfm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).

155. Riskin, supra note 151, at 24.
156. Mary Adkins, Moving out of the 1990s: An Argument for Updating Protocol on Divorce
Mediation in Domestic Abuse Cases, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 103 (2010).
157. Zumeta, supra note 154.
158. Dorothy J. Della Noce, Communicating Quality Assurance: A Case Study of Mediator Profiles
on a Court Roster, 84 U. OF N. DAKOTA L. REV. 769, 772-73 (2008); Bingham, supra note 123, at 103
et seq.
159. Regarding the value of cultural competence in court-adjunct family mediation, see Isolina Ricci,
Court-Based Mandatory Mediation and Peggy English & Linda C. Neilson, Certifying Mediators, 483515, 509 in Divorce and Family Mediation: Models, Techniques, and Applications (Jay Folberg, Ann
Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004); Alison Taylor & Ernest A. Sanchez, Out of the White Box: Adapting
Mediation to the Needs of Hispanic and Other Minorities within American Society, 29 FAM. &
CONCIL. CTS. REV. 114 (1991). These competencies may be linguistic or cultural, or may be in a
particular field such as family law, domestic violence, etc.
160. Mayer, Facilitative Mediation, supra note 151, at 20-21.
161. Folberg, Milne & Salem, supra note 151, at 14; Zumeta, supra note 154; Mayer, Facilitative
Mediation, supra note 151, at 33. For a theory of interest-based facilitative mediation in the divorce
context, see Desmond Ellis & Noreen Stuckless, Mediating and Negotiating Marital Conflicts 12-13
(1996).
162. Gewurz, supra note 128, at 143; Beth M. Erickson, Therapeutic Mediation: A Saner Way of
Disputing, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 233 (1997); Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 10-11.

A

recent empirical study from Australia suggests that that facilitative mediation of family disputes in that
country does not usually pursue goals of this nature. Batagol & Brown, supra note 44, at xxv.
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respect, trust and understanding that will enable them to meet shared contingencies.1
However, the goals of facilitative mediation are not always so lofty. A modest compromise on a discrete legal or financial issue is a legitimate goal for a facilitative mediation. Leonard Riskin's canonical article identified a "problemdefinition continuum" for mediators. The two poles of the continuum represent
two different approaches to defining the problem to be solved in mediation: "narrow" and "broad."' 6" Riskin observed that a facilitative approach is compatible
with a narrow, broad, or intermediate definition of the problem.' 65
For example, suppose a child visitation dispute is being mediated. The noncustodial parent has brought an application seeking an expansion of his weekends
with the child. He would like these weekends to begin on Friday evening instead
of Saturday morning. The custodial parent opposes this change, and supports the
status quo. The facilitative mediator could accept the parties' relatively narrow
definition of the problem as pertaining to the commencement time of the weekend
visit. Alternatively, the problem could be more broadly defined, in terms of safeguarding the child's relationship with the non-custodial parent, while preserving a
stable environment in the child's primary home.
B. FacilitativeMediation in ParentingDisputes
Facilitative mediation appears to be well-suited to custody and visitation cases. As noted in Part I, the distinctive characteristics of these disputes include (i)
the likelihood that the parties will have on-going interaction, and (ii) the relevance
of this relationship to the goal of the advancing the child's interest.166 Scholars
have argued that cases with on-going relationships between the parties are natural
candidates for facilitative mediation.16 7 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has called for
facilitative mediation when the "process may be more important than the substantive outcome."' 6 8 This is true in many parenting disputes, where evidence suggests that the precise terms of the parenting agreement reached are often less important to the child's well-being than is the nature of the parties' subsequent interactions.169 Similarly, Frank Sander has suggested that the facilitative process is
more conducive to focusing on the future of an on-going relationship, while adjudication and evaluative mediation are primarily about the past.170 In an article that
was generally critical of court mediation programs, Deborah Hensler granted an
163. Fuller,supra note 30, at 325.
164. Riskin, supranote 151, at 18-23; see also Gewurz, supra note 128, at 140.
165. Riskin, supranote 151, at 18-23.
166. Berger, supra note I1, at 274; Trinder & Kellett, supra note 12, at 326.
167. Labour relations disputes share this characteristic with custody and visitation disputes. Facilitative mediation had become widespread in North American labour relations significantly before it was
applied to other civil disputes. Colleen M. Hanycz, Whither Community Justice - the Rise of CourtConnectedMediation in the UnitedStates, 25 WINDSOR Y.B. AccEss JUST. 167, 180-86 (2007).
168. Menkel-Meadow, Forand Against Settlement, supra note 31, at 511.
169. For the argument that precisely determining the "right answer" in a parenting dispute is not
particularly important to the child, see Semple, Whose Best Interests?, supra note 36, at 319-21.
Regarding the importance of the parties' on-going relationship quality, see supra Part II.
170. Sander, supra note 135.
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exception for parenting cases, due to the "public policy interest in helping divorcing parents maintain a sufficiently positive relationship to enable them to care
adequately for their children."17 1
Amadei and Lehrburger have noted that facilitative mediation is well suited to
resolving conflicts in which the disputing parties have "common or complementary interests." 72 Unlike a purely distributive conflict, in which one party's gain
results in a loss to the other, the parties to a custody dispute often have very significant complementary interests. Every parent wants what is best for his or her
child, a common interest between two people discussing their child's future.173
Moreover, most parents wish to spend at least a few waking hours doing something other than caring for a child. This usually creates a complementary interest
in having the child spend some time in the care of each parent.

C. EmpiricalEvidence: The Impact ofFamily Mediation
1. Benefits ofFacilitativeMediation
a. Settlement Rates andParticipantSatisfaction
While the empirical literature about family mediation may not be extensive, 174 it is voluminous compared to the sparse research available on judicial
settlement-seeking. The most persuasive evidence regarding facilitative mediation pertains to settlement rates and participant satisfaction. The percentage of
mediated family cases producing some form of agreement has been reported to be
as low at 46% and as high as 94%. 1 A variety of studies have discovered that the
vast majority of mediation participants are satisfied with their experience.176 Me77
diation is especially satisfactory to parties when compared to divorce litigation.
Beck and Sales reviewed several mediation studies and found that mediation participant satisfaction rates were consistently in the 60-80% range.' 7 8 Joan Kelly
171. Hensler, supra note 59, at 82.
172. Robin N. Amadei & Lillian S. Lehrburger, The World of Mediation: A Spectrum of Styles, 51
DISP. RESOL. J. 62, 64-5 (1996). This article specifically mentions "divorcing parents" as good candidates for the "process-oriented mediation style," which appears to be synonymous with facilitative
mediation.
173. Mayer, Facilitative Mediation, supra note 151, at 38.
174. Donald T. Saposnek, Commentary: The Future of the History of Family Mediation Research, 22
CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 37, 39 (2004); Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 21-24.
175. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supra note 6, at 18; Joan B. Kelly, Family Mediation
Research: Is There Empirical Supportfor the Field?, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 3, 10, 16. For other
reported settlement rates within this range, see DESMOND ELLIS, FAMILY MEDIATION PILOT PROJECT:
FINAL REPORT (1994); C. J. RICHARDSON, COURT-BASED DIVORCE MEDIATION IN FOUR CANADIAN
CITIES: AN OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH RESULTS (1988); Ballard et al., supra note 58, at 21; U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EFFECTIVENESS OF ACCESS AND VISITATION

GRANT PROGRAMS (2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-02-00300.pdf; MINISTRY
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (ONTARIO), COURT SERVICES DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT 2009-2010
(2009); Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra, & Tara Grover, Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections,
43 FAM. CT. REV. 27, 30-31 (2005).
176. Lori Anne Shaw, Divorce Mediation Outcome Research:A Meta-Analysis, 27 CONFLICT RESOL.
Q. 447,457-58,460 (2010).
177. Emery, Sbarra & Grover, supra note 175, at 28.
178. Beck & Sales, supranote 98, at 77.
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reviewed three other mediation studies, with satisfaction rates between 66% and
76%.179 In a recent study of California's mediation program, 87% of respondents
agreed that "mediation is a good way to come up with a parenting plan" and 88%
indicated that they would recommend mediation to friends. 180 Although parties
that settle their disputes report greater satisfaction than those whose mediations do
not produce agreement,' 8 ' satisfaction with mediation is driven by factors beyond
its ability to lead to agreement. In California, for example, the rates of satisfaction
far exceed the rates of settlement.' 82 Participants find satisfaction in mediation
because of the process, rather than the outcome.' 83 In particular, parties value the
opportunity to tell their story to a neutral party.184
b. Long Term Benefits
In addition to increasing party satisfaction, family mediation may also produce deeper long-term benefits. Researchers have investigated the extent to which
mediation influences compliance with child support and parenting obligations.
Some studies have found that mediation increases compliance, 8 5 while others
have found no effect,'8 6 or only a short-term effect.' 87 One study found reduced
conflict between disputing parents during the two-year period following a custody
mediation.' 8 8 This reduced level of conflict was not found more than two years
after the mediation, however the study concluded that the mediation experience
may have taught participants to use a "more direct and mutual style" in resolving
their conflicts.1 89 Finally, a quantitative meta-analysis of mediation studies found
that mediation had a "fairly large positive effect" on the quality of the disputing
parties' relationship.190
c. Benefitsfor Children
The potential for family mediation to produce demonstrable benefits for the
children involved is very important. Unfortunately, the evidence on the benefit to
children is inconsistent. In California, 89% of family mediation participants
agreed that the mediator "helped to keep us focused on our children's interests."191
179. Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supra note 98, at 14, 17, and 22.
180. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supra note 6, at 21. See also Randall W. Leite &
Kathleen Clark, Participants'Evaluations of Aspects of the Legal Child Custody Process and
Preferencesfor Court Services, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 260 (2007) (reporting a survey which compared
satisfaction rates with various family court services, including mediation).
181. Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 77-78; Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supra note 98, at 7-8.
182. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supra note 6.
183. Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 27; Bush, What Do We Need a Mediator For?,supra note 97, at
17.
184. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supra,note 6.
185. Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supra note 99, at 14-15 & 23; Emery, Sbarra & Grover,
supra note 175, at 27; Adkins, supra note 156, at 127.
186. RICHARDSON, supra note 175, at 33.
187. Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 96.
188. Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supranote 98, at 18.
189. Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supranote 98, at 18.
190. Shaw, supra note 176, at 460.
191. Center for Families, Children & the Courts, supranote 6, at 21.
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Lori Anne Shaw's quantitative meta-analysis based on several studies found moderate overall positive effects of family mediation on parental understanding of
their children's needs.192 Robert Emery's divorce mediation study found that,
twelve years after a mediated divorce, non-custodial parents remained significantly more involved with their children than were non-custodial parents who had
litigated their divorce.1 93 Additionally, no commensurate increase in inter-parent
conflict was found.194 C.J. Richardson found a similar phenomenon in his study
of divorce mediation participants from Montreal. 195 However, the study's findings
from participants in Winnipeg were inconsistent with the Montreal findings.196
This may be evidence that the particular circumstances of a family court mediation program, including the amount of time and funding available for each case,
and the quality of the mediators available, are important determinants of its longterm success.197
However, positive findings regarding compliance, relationship quality, and
parenting behaviour have not been consistently replicated. 98 Some of the more
ambitious claims regarding mediation's benefits- that it reduces inter-parent
conflict and that it aids children's long-term adjustment to divorce- are not supported by the evidence.199 Beck and Sales, whose book on the subject reviewed a
large quantity of empirical literature, concluded that mediation has little or no
effect on the long-term ability of separated couples to communicate, especially
when conflict levels are high.200
One of the goals of this paper is to compare the merits of facilitative mediation and judicial pretrial conferences, as alternative ways to further the interests of
children whose parents are separating. The existing family mediation evaluation
literature is of limited assistance for two reasons. First, the researchers have traditionally compared family mediation to courtroom litigation, and not judicial pretrial conferences or settlement-seeking. 201 Second, non-judicial family mediation
is not always purely facilitative in character. Many of the studies do not clearly
describe the nature of the mediation being studied, and whether it is facilitative or
evaluative. 202 Research findings about family mediation are not, therefore, necessarily derived from study of the idealized facilitative mode described above.
However, recent literature on the topic indicates that facilitative and nonauthoritarian settlement-seeking do in fact produce better results in most parenting
disputes. Dean Pruitt and his colleagues studied the process and outcomes of
mediation sessions at a community clinic. 203 Unlike most mediation research, this
192. Shaw, supranote 176, at 460.
193. Emery, Sbarra, & Grover, supra note 175, at 30-3 1.
194. Emery, Sbarra, & Grover, supra note 175, at 30-31.
195. RICHARDSON, supra note 175, at 39.

196. Id.
197. RICHARDSON, supra note 175, at 45 (identifying other possible explanations for differential
success).
198. See, e.g., RICHARDSON, supranote 175, at 38-39.
199. See generally Beck & Sales, supra note 98, at 57-97; Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supra
note 98, at 18; Saposnek, supranote 174, at 48.
200. Beck & Sales, supranote 98, at 67-68.
201. Shaw, supranote 176; Beck & Sales, supranote 98, at 22.
202. Kelly, Family Mediation Research, supranote 98, at 4, 30.
203. D.G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 313, 317 (1993).
Some, but not all of the cases mediated were family matters. Id
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study placed observers within the mediation sessions. One of the attributes which
they observed to varying extents in different sessions was "joint problemsolving," a type of discussion in which "disputants ... define the problems underlying their conflict, examine alternative ways of solving these problems, and make
a mutual decision among these alternatives."2 04 This concept bears a clear and
close relationship to the doctrine of facilitative mediation as described above. For
the respondents in the disputes, there was a significant correlation between the
presence ofjoint problem solving in the mediation sessions and the quality of their
subsequent relationships.205 The authors conclude that "one road to relationship
improvement, in community mediation as in marital therapy, is to get the disputants to engage in joint problem solving about the issues that divide them. This
provides supervised experience in a skill that is likely to be subsequently useful." 206
Even more germane is the work of an English team led by Liz Trinder.
Trinder and Kellett studied "conciliation" schemes in English family courts, comparing the mechanisms by which they encouraged settlement in visitation disputes
and the outcomes of the interventions. The researchers found a "high-judicial
control" model of settlement-seeking in place at the Principal Registry of the Family Division in London. In this court the judge leads the discussions, and lawyers
generally speak for the parties. 207 The court in Essex county, by contrast, deployed a "low-judicial control" model which seems similar to mandatory facilitative mediation. In Essex, before any judge is involved, an employee of the Child
and Family Court Advisory and Support Service (CAFCASS) leads a joint meeting in which he or she "encourage[s] both parties to speak to one another ... focused on the present and the future." 208 In an intermediate or mixed position were
three courts in Cambridgeshire and Suffolk counties. Here, each case goes before
the judge as a first step but most are then sent to a CAFCASS-led mediation session similar to that used in the Essex court.2 09
The three courts were evaluated according to the number of agreements
reached on visitation disputes, and on various measures of party satisfaction. The
high-judicial control court significantly underperformed the other two in terms of
number of agreements reached and satisfaction. 2 10 The low-judicial control court
(Essex) also created noticeably higher participant satisfaction rates than did the
intermediate courts (Cambridge and Suffolk).21 1 This study was a "natural" rather
than controlled experiment. The degree of judicial control was by no means the
only difference between the three research sites. It does not therefore establish a
clear correlation between judicial involvement and quality of outcomes. Nonethe204. Id. at 317.
205. Id. at 323-24, 327. There is no explanation offered for why this held true only for the respondents, and not the complainants in the disputes.
206. D. G. Pruitt, Process and outcome in community mediation, NEGOTIATION JOURNAL 365, 374
(1995).
207. Trinder and Kellett, supranote 12, at 324.
208. LIZ TRINDER, et al., MAKING CONTACT HAPPEN OR MAKING CONTACT WORK? THE PROCESS AND
OUTCOMES OF IN-COURT CONCILIATION (2006), available at

http://www.dca.gov.uk/research/2006/03_2006.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2014), 17.
209. Id. at 22.

210. Id at 41.
211. Id. at 50.
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less, it does provide an interesting hint that the self-determinative mode of facilitative mediation may indeed have substantial advantages over the authoritative
mode ofjudicial pretrial conferences.
The empirical evidence on facilitative mediation of custody disputes clearly
establishes that it consistently produces settlement and party satisfaction. The
evidence also indicates, tentatively, that facilitative mediation can improve interparent relationships and compliance with custody agreements, at least in the short
term.212 The intuitively-appealing idea of a natural harmony between facilitative
mediation and parenting disputes does seem to have basis in fact. Judicial settlement-seeking for family court cases does not have much evidentiary support; in
fact it is not even clear that it increases settlement rates. If it is true, as argued
above, that judicial settlement-seeking is inherently authoritative, then it follows
from the analysis here that this characteristic makes it inferior to facilitative mediation as a dispute-resolution technique for custody and visitation disputes. The
Pruitt and Trinder studies focusing on the role of joint problem-solving and judicial control add tentative support this conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION: FOR SEPARATE SPHERES
Assigning mediation of custody and visitation disputes to facilitative mediators, as opposed to judges, would revitalize both mediation and adjudication of
family disputes. While judicial authority is essential to resolving family law disputes, its natural channel is adjudication rather than mediation.213 Lengthy waiting periods for adjudication are common in many family courts, and requiring
judges to spend time pursuing settlements exacerbates this problem. As Judith
Resnik and others have argued, "scarce judicial resources should be conserved and
employed only when judges' special skill - adjudication - is required."2 14 Separating the spheres could also revitalize judicial authority by reaffirming its link to
due process. 215

This article has analyzed judicially-led settlement attempts in custody and
visitation cases. Custody disputes are distinguished from other cases by three distinctive attributes - the importance of a non-party's interests, the prevalence of
self-represented parties, and the importance of the parties' on-going relationship.
With continuing reference to these characteristics, the paper then subjected the
212. Supra article section V.C. 1(b) and (c).
213. A number of procedural scholars have made this case for separate spheres, although without
reference to the specificities of the custody and visitation context. See, e.g., Michael T. Colatrella,
Court-Performed Mediation in the People's Republic of China: A Proposed Model to Improve the
UnitedStates FederalDistrict Courts' Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 391, 41516 (2000); Sander, supra note 135, at 22; Roberts, supra note 142, at 557 (arguing for mediation and
adjudication being conceptually and practically distinct). Sarokin, supra note 45, at 437; Tomquist,
supra note 50, at 773 (suggesting that judicial settlement-seeking could be appropriate in defined and
restricted circumstances).
214. Molot, supra note 82, at 32; Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 435
(1982). In light of the evidence that many cases do not require judicial attention in order to settle,
Leroy Tomquist goes so far as to argue that "the judicial time spent in settlement discussions for all
cases is greater than the time it would have taken to try the few cases that would not have settled without intervention." Tomquist, supra note 50 at 763.
215. Sarokin, supra note 45, at 434; Cratsley, supra note 114, at 574-75; Tomquist, supra note 50, at
772-773.
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practice in question to a figurative mock trial. The first allegation was that there is
too much settlement and not enough neutral decision-making in these cases; the
second was that the justice system need not encourage settlement. The characteristics of the justice system and parenting disputes require the practice to be found
"innocent" on these counts.
However this paper has sought to convince its jury of readers to convict on
the third count - that judges are not the people who should be encouraging settlement in custody and visitation cases. The empirical evidence about the practice
does not even establish clearly that it increases settlement rates, let alone that it
accomplishes any of the deeper and longer-term goals which we should look for in
parenting dispute resolution. Moreover, the high expense of judicial labor, the
judiciary's collective ambivalence about mediation, and judicial autonomy raise
questions as to the suitability of judges for this role.
The fourth relevant characteristic of judges is their inherent authority. This
authority is a consequence of judicial enforcement power, predictive power, and
moral suasion, and it has an effect whether or not the judge seeks to use it. As
discussed above, authority in the settlement-seeker is authority not held by the
parties, and party empowerment and self-determination are essential elements of
the facilitative model.216 Parents who are following a judge's way forward cannot
simultaneously be blazing their own path. The hallmarks of facilitative mediation,
self-determination and party-empowerment, are essentially incompatible with
authoritative, judicial settlement-seeking. As Frank Sander put the point, "the
skills required of judges and mediators are sufficiently different that we cannot
assume that even first-rate judges will turn out to be first-rate mediators."
There is a natural harmony between the facilitative approach and parenting
disputes, and a substantial body of empirical evidence supports the use of facilitative mediation this context. Every family deserves the opportunity to reach a facilitated and self-determinative solution to a parenting dispute, unless domestic
violence or dramatic power imbalance make it clearly inappropriate. This paper
has concluded by arguing for a separation of spheres in family court. Entrusting
the settlement-seeking task in parenting disputes to facilitative and non-judicial
mediators could revitalize both settlement-seeking and adjudication, which are
both essential. Thus, while the "mock trial" conceit of this article is quintessentially adversarial in nature, the proposed remedy is a gentle form of restorative
justice - a reinvigorated family court, with a renewed and enhanced ability to
resolve each parenting case in the best interest of the child.

216. Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, I MEDIATION Q. 3, 9
(1983).
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